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On the Public Discourse of Religion:




Abstract: Debates over the involvement of religion in the public sphere look set
to be one of the defining themes of the 21st century. But while religious issues
have attracted a large degree of scholarly attention, the public discourse of
religion itself, in terms of the effort to assert and legitimize a role for faith in
the public realm, has remained notably under-researched. This article marks
an initial step to address this deficiency by deconstructing the public
discourse of Christianity in the United Kingdom. It argues that, while
appealing for representation on the grounds of liberal equality, the overall
goal of this discourse is to establish a role for itself as a principal source of
moral authority, and to exempt itself from the evidentially-based standards
and criteria that govern public life.
INTRODUCTION
Politics and religion may form two of the three great conversational
taboos, but their inter-relationship forms one of the most potent and con-
tentious issues of modern times. In particular, the debate over the role of
religion in the public sphere looks set to be one of the defining themes of
the 21st century. Yet, for all the scholarly attention that has been devoted
to religious matters, the discourses that are deployed by religious actors in
their efforts to gain, exert, and legitimize public influence remain an area
that is notably under-researched. This article marks an initial attempt
to address this deficit by deconstructing the public discourse of
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Christianity in the United Kingdom (UK). Based on an extensive analysis
of speeches, sermons, interviews, and texts from senior Church represen-
tatives, as well as from prominent public figures and other organizations
engaged in the debate, it sets out to map the internal architecture of this
discourse, and to show how its various nodes combine to form an over-
arching structure of argumentation. The article contends that, while
asserting the legitimacy of public influence on the grounds of liberal
equality and fairness, the public discourse of Christianity in the UK ulti-
mately seeks to establish a role for itself as a principal arbiter on moral
issues, and to exempt itself from the evidentially-based standards and cri-
teria that govern public life. In so doing, this highlights the clear tensions
that exist between secular and religious arguments for the representation
of faith in the public sphere.
RELIGION AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
Debates over the role of religion in the public sphere, look certain to be
one of the central and defining areas of political life in the 21st century.
At the present time there are few countries in the world that can claim to
possess a fully secular separation between the state and religion (Fox
2006), and the influence of the latter in the public realm is one that con-
tinues to grow (Philpott 2007). Indeed, that the multifarious and abundant
intersections of politics and religion in the modern world need no intro-
duction, and that highlighting them would be a conspicuous and mundane
task, it aptly demonstrates the salience of the issue. As an obvious field
for scholarly endeavor, the topic of religion is one that has also attracted
an intense amount of academic attention, traversing a variety of disci-
plines, often with interdisciplinary overlap between them, including
anthropology (Hann 2007; Saler 2008), history (Morris 2003; Mancini
2007), sociology (Davie 2000, 2006; Coleman, Ivani-Challian and
Robinson 2004; Crockett and Voas 2006), law (Greenawalt 1998;
Danchin 2008); philosophy (Macdonald 2005; Habermas 2006), psychol-
ogy (Green and Rubin 1991; Barrett 2000; Boyer 2003; Rossano 2006);
economics (Lipford and Tollinson 2003; Fase 2005), and political science
(Keddie 1998; Kotler-Berkowitz 2001; Philpott 2007). Within this highly
congested scholarly sphere, however, the issue of religious discourse has
been something of a neglected area. Moreover, even when this has been
touched upon, studies remain problematic, often focusing on internal










































realm, rather than seeking to unpack the internal structures of religious
discourse itself (Elliot 2007; Bedford-Strohm 2008), or focusing on
aspects of religious discourse that are limited to particular issues or to
specific denominations within a particular faith (Laermans 1995;
Dillon 1996; Wuthnow 1988; Karaflogka 2002; Leonard 2003).
But while the public discourse of religion remains overlooked as a
topic of study, an understanding of its internal dynamics is of crucial
importance for understanding the intersection between religion and poli-
tics in the modern world. As the principal means by which those advocat-
ing a public role for a particular faith seek to promote and legitimize this
end, a public discourse of religion is necessarily based on a mutually
shared interpretation of the main problems and challenges that such
objectives face, as well as the most appropriate and effective method
of dealing with them. Emerging, on this basis, through a process of delib-
eration and debate, the resultant discourse (which exists only as a fluid
societal relation, and which is independent of those from whose efforts
it arose) denotes an attempt to shape, mould and frame both the terms
and content of public debate. In essence, this involves marshalling and
deploying various lines of argument, emphasizing and de-emphasizing
certain aspects, principles, and values rather than others, in an effort to
explain, persuade and mobilize support. In so doing, the overarching
structure of a public discourse comprises a range of specific argumentum
nodes, or components, each of which serves a specific and limited
purpose, but all of which, when combined, form a holistic, strategically
constructed and purposeful narrative (Fairclough 2000; Finlayson
2007). Indeed, as the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams
(2007b, 43), himself explains, the language of public life “is more than
just “mere words.” It is “rhetoric” in the classic sense of that term . . .
rhetoric as language meant to persuade others.”
The aim of this article, then, is to establish a marker in the attempt to
understand the public discourse of religion in terms of the manner in
which it seeks to secure and legitimize a role for faith in the public
sphere. The core objective in this regard is to deconstruct the arguments
that are presented by those in favor of this form of religious influence and
to map out the main features of its internal structure; to outline the way in
which its various elements combine to form an interrelated seam of argu-
mentation. In so doing, the focus here is on the public discourse of
Christianity in the UK. For this, there are two main reasons. First, restricting
the focus to a limited and specialized case, as opposed to a broader analysis
of religious discourse in general is useful in several important respects.









































In this particular instance, the sufficiently entrenched, although sufficiently
declining, nature of Christianity in the UK provides fertile conditions for the
emergence of a pro-actively argumentative discourse; namely one that is
compelled to justify, legitimize, and account for its public role, and one
that is therefore more likely to contain a heightened emphasis on the core dis-
cursive elements of the public case for religion, than one derived from a reli-
gionwhose public rolewas assured,without challenge, and taken-for-granted.
Determining these core elements is alsomore likely to be achieved in the case
examined here since the arguments deployed by those seeking a greater public
role for Christianity are unlikely to be diluted by the incorporation of
“extraneous” elements, such as would in all probability be required by
those seeking a greater role in UK public life for Islam or Judaism, for
instance, where the discourses in play would invariably be shaped by their
minority and, certainly in the case of Islam, by their “culturally alien”
status. This is not to say that understanding such extremities and the
extent of their divergence from more linear modes of religious discourse is
unimportant, merely that it is necessary, as a first step, to try and establish
the base-lines that more straightforward discursive strategies might take,
before broadening the analysis to include more complex cases and varieties.
A second reason why it may be instructive to study the public dis-
course of Christianity in the UK concerns its diversity. Indeed, one argu-
ment that could be made against the study of religious discourse per se
might naturally be that the sheer diversity of religious groups and
beliefs precludes the possibility of a single coherent discourse emerging.
And, certainly, Christianity in the UK is nothing if not eclectic; consist-
ing of multiple denominations ranging from Anglican, Catholic,
Methodist, Baptist, Mormon, Evangelical, and Christadelphian, along
with a wide range of Christian organizations seeking to influence the
public sphere, notable examples of which include Theos, Ekklesia, and
the Christian Institute. Nevertheless, an extensive reading of texts,
sermons, speeches, interviews, commentaries, and documents from
leading figures and agencies involved in the public promotion of the
Christian faith in the UK reveals that, while divergent views clearly
exist on theological and other matters, most of those involved do, in
fact, share a broad set of common positions on the means of securing a
role for Christianity within the public sphere. These are based on both
a common interpretation of the broader socio-cultural position of
Christianity in the UK, and a common view of the best means of
dealing with the challenges that it faces. While Christian groups and










































particular use to which Christian influence within the public realm should
be put (although, as shall be seen, common elements abide here also), the
discursive efforts to establish and legitimize admittance into the public
realm in the first instance are markedly similar. To this extent, therefore,
there are clear grounds for asserting that a coherent public discourse
for Christianity in the UK does exist. Indeed, that the same discursive
elements (arguments, emphases, assertions, and so on) are advanced by
a wide range of Christian groups and individuals (although this is not,
of course, to say that each and every group, still less, each and every indi-
vidual within them, will subscribe to every single aspect) indicates that
the nature of these discursive forms is far from superficial. As Bartley
(2007a), co-director of the Christian think-tank, Ekklesia, notes, while
it may seem as if “the Church’s political perspective is so diverse that
it can hardly be considered a movement at all,” there is, at the same
time, “a growing recognition that where Christians are divided over theol-
ogy they can be united around a political viewpoint.”
The rest of this paper outlines the core elements of Christian public
discourse in the UK. These nodal points, which together constitute the
broader narrative for Christianity in the public sphere, are as follows:
(1) that religion in general (and Christianity in particular) faces marginaliza-
tion and exclusion from the public sphere by an intolerant form of secular-
ism. (2) That secular critics have, willfully or otherwise, misrepresented
religion as being irrational and dogmatic. (3) That the ontological and epis-
temological claims of secular Enlightenment thought are not universal, but
are merely one of a number of equally valid world-views. (4) That religion
(and therefore Christianity) is an equally valid world-view to that of the
Enlightenment, and thus has a right to be represented in the public sphere.
(5) That religion (and, again, Christianity in particular) is a principal
source of, and authority on, human morality (which Enlightenment
thought is unable to provide). (6) That any attempt to exclude religion
from the public sphere will have adverse social consequences. And
(7), that the claims of religion are not amenable to scientific, evidentially-
based modes of inquiry, and, as such, should not be subject to the usual,
evidentially-based rules and norms of the public sphere.
PERIPHERAL VISIONS
The broader social context shaping the public discourse of Christianity in
the UK is characterized by four main processes: the progressively waning









































influence of Christianity throughout the postwar period, the concomitant
rise of secularism over the same duration, the spread of other faiths (most
notably Islam) over the past three decades, and recurrent internal tensions
within Christianity over issues such as homosexuality, abortion, and the
ordination of women priests and bishops. Here, the steady decline in
church membership (with the Church of England now at a third of its
1930s levels) as well as the numbers of people whom regularly attend
church services (falling persistently from the 1960s) provides the most
apparent and often cited indicators of decline (National Secular Society
2006; also see Morris 2003). While 71.6% of the population declared
themselves Christian in the last census during 2001, this is considered
by many to be an inflated figure,1 and according to a more recent esti-
mate, the scale of erosion is such that Christianity in the UK is now on
course to be superseded by Islam in terms of actively practicing
members by 2035 (Brierley 2008). Alongside this, a more general
decline in religious belief itself is also evident (Voas and Crockett
2005; Crockett and Voas 2006); a recent poll by the Joseph Rowntree
Foundation, for example, finding that faith is now regarded by many
people in the UK as intolerant, irrational, and divisive (Watts 2008).
This weakening socio-cultural position, manifest in concerns about the
decline in Christianity’s position as the UK’s dominant faith and the
erosion of the UK’s Christian culture, forms one of the main themes in
Christian public discourse. The Bishop of Rochester, Michael Nazir-Ali,
for instance, has persistently warned of the “inherent tendency in
Anglicanism to capitulate,” asserting that “all that is of worth in [Britain]
is based on Christianity” (Mackay 2008), a view that is shared, among
others, by the Bishop of Winchester, Michael Scott-Joynt (2003), who
states, given the long and deeply-entrenched role of Christianity in British
social, political, and cultural life, that “this society has some responsibility
to listen to Christians if it’s going to understand itself and its formation.”
A central motif in such concerns is a sense of marginalization, discrimi-
nation, and disempowerment in the face of an ever-more secular society,
and as those critical of religion (most prominently the so-called “New
Atheists” such as Harris 2004; Dawkins 2006; Dennett 2006; Hitchens
2007) have become increasingly emboldened in their attacks. Lynda
Barley (2006 Q1), the head of research at the Church of England, notes that
Christianity is under assault from the “forces of secularization”; Cardinal
Cormac Murphy-O’Connor (2006b), the head of the Catholic Church in
England and Wales, observes a “new secular aggressiveness” marked by a










































the ex-Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey (2007), describes the chal-
lenge as that of “a militant atheism that is determined to rubbish faith at all
costs”; and JonathanChaplin (2007 Q1), director of the Kirby Laing Institute for
Christian Ethics, notes “a widely held and intensely felt prejudice against
appealing to religious convictions in the public square.” The Christian
view on this point is well summarized by the Evangelical Alliance (2006,
22), who protest that “anti-religious secularist forces . . . have recently
tended to push their way into dominance in the regulation of public life,”
and that “secularist policies, far from being “neutral” . . . merely replicate
discriminatory attitudes towards religion” (Evangelical Alliance 2006, 91).
From this sense of peripheralization comes the accompanying assertion
that Christians in the UK need to counter these threats by becoming more
politically active and by seeking a greater involvement in public affairs.
As the Christian think-tank, Theos (2006), notes, Christians need to seek
an “overall aim of putting God “back” into the public domain”, and that
(despite acknowledging an “extreme nervousness” on the part of the
general public “about any hint of the divine in public discourse”) it is now
necessary “to demonstrate that religion in public debate . . . is crucial to
enable such public debate to connect with the communities it seeks to
serve.” Seconding this, the fellow Christian think-tank, Ekklesia (2006),
similarly notes that “faith communities (not least the churches) are
looking for a new role, new finance, and a new credibility in their battle
against long-term decline and public indifference.” Indeed, the point is
also put that Christians have, in fact, no other credible alternative to political
activism. Nick Spencer (2008), Director of Studies at Theos, asserts that
“[t]he Christian religion is a public one and no amount of theological wrig-
gling or low-level secular bullying will change that,” while the Archbishop
of Canterbury (Williams 2008a) maintains that “politics is inescapable for
anyone in or out of the Church or any other religious community.”
Arguments over the public influence of religion, he thus observes
(Williams 2007a), are, in fact, the terrain of a much deeper conflict, one
that “is not simply a matter of religious believers defending themselves,”
but which is fundamentally “about the character of intellectual debate,
about the politics, the power struggles.” A similar point on this is also
made by Murphy-O’Connor (2008b), who, warning that Britain cannot be
allowed to become “a God-free zone,” declares an urgent need “to reach a
new consensus on how best the public role of religious organizations can
be safeguarded and their rights upheld” (BBC News 2007).2
Whether intentional or otherwise, such calls-to-arms against perceived
injustice have two important effects. On the one hand, these opening









































claims may help to unify and galvanize members of the Christian faith,
and, on the other, may elicit (at least potentially) a more sympathetic
hearing from non-Christians and moderate secularists on the legitimacy
of Christian involvement in public affairs. These effects, and the image
of unfairness from which they derive, are also present in the second
element of Christian public discourse in the UK; namely, a negation of
the apparent way in which religion has been portrayed by secularists
(and particularly by the “New Atheists”) as dogmatic, irrational, and
the antithesis of the Enlightenment values of reason, rationality, and pro-
gress. In short, the subsequent assertion is that religion has been misrepre-
sented in secular discourse in a crude and one-dimensional fashion.
McGrath (2005, 135), for example, professor of historical theology at
Oxford university and a prominent public defender of Christianity,
staunchly criticizes what he describes as the prevailing secular view of
religious people as “dishonest, liars, fools and knaves,” of being “incap-
able of responding honestly to the real world, and preferring to invent a
false, pernicious and delusory world into which to entice the unwary, the
young and the naı¨ve.” Against such calumny, McGrath (2005, 112–123)
contends that a key aim of Christian discourse should be to reject the
“ludicrous definition” of faith as blind and irrational (a view designed
“with the deliberate intention of making religious faith seem a piece of
intellectual buffoonery”), and to assert instead a view of faith as “the con-
viction of the mind based on adequate evidence.” This concern is also
expressed by Tony Blair (2008), the ex-British Prime Minister, now
head of his own Faith Foundation and another prominent advocate of
Christianity in the public sphere, who maintains that politicians declaring
themselves to be people of faith run the risk of being “considered weird,”
as acting “at the promptings of an inscrutable deity, free from reason
rather than in accordance with it.” The claim that secular critics of reli-
gion have duplicitously attacked a false target for their own ends is
also put up by Williams (2007a), who insists that “whatever the religion
[that] is being attacked here it’s not actually what I believe in,” and by
Murphy-O’Connor (2008a), who contends that “[f ]aith for us is the flow-
ering of reason, not its betrayal,” and that “I simply don’t recognise my
faith in what is presented by these critics as Christian faith.”
By taking issue with the apparent secular critique of religion in this
way, the claim that the core of the secularist case is no more than a
crude misrepresentation plays a key role in Christian public discourse,
helping to erode the view that Christian beliefs (or religious belief in










































from the public sphere. Indeed, this point is taken further in its ensuing,
third discursive element, which aims to undermine the dominant position
of Enlightenment thought itself as the sole source of properly constituted
knowledge claims about the world, to challenge its assumptions about
human reason, the role of rationality and the inevitability of progress,
and to present this as being simply one among a multitude of equivalent
world views. By calling into question the epistemological claims of the
Enlightenment on the grounds of their inherently unprovable and herme-
tically sealed nature, this seeks to establish an intellectual space into
which can be inserted the claim that religion is an equally valid view
of human reality, and thus has an equally valid claim to representation
in the public realm. On this, for instance, Murphy-O’Connor (2008b)
states that critical secularism “sees religious belief as mere prejudice
while failing to recognise the doctrinaire nature of its own position; the
Archbishop of York, Dr John Sentamu (2007a), contends that “dogmatic
assumptions also underline non-religious worldviews — Marxism,
Darwinism, Freudianism, capitalism, secularism, humanism and so on”;
McGrath (2005, 116–117) notes that “[p]aradoxically, atheism itself
emerges as a faith, possessed of a remarkable degree of conceptual iso-
morphism to theism”; and Theos (2006, 64–68) claim that the
Enlightenment belief in human progress is “little different from a reli-
gious one . . . an article of faith just like the resurrection.” Indeed, as
Williams (2008c) puts it, the secular-scientific world view “is itself
deeply vulnerable to intellectual challenge and is so partly because, pre-
cisely, it’s trying to be a “theology” (Williams 2008c) Enlightenment lib-
eralism, he thus maintains, “now appears as simply one cultural and
historical phenomenon among others.” (Williams 2005).
AFFAIRS OF THE STATE
From this it is a short step to the claim that, since Enlightenment thought
and faith are equally valid means of understanding reality, there can be no
reason to preclude religious involvement in public affairs, and the more
so in a pluralist liberal democratic society (and especially one in which
Christianity remains numerically and culturally prominent). Yet beyond
this there is no fixed political theology on the precise form that church-
state relations should take. As Joel Edwards (2006), head of the
Evangelical Alliance, explains, ‘“[f ]rom its very beginning Christian
faith has been embroiled in the ambiguity between the state and the









































individual,” and as Murphy-O’Connor (2007c) points out, “the diversity
of ways in which the Church can and has conducted its public witness
suggests that there is no blueprint for that witness, no model for how
close to or distant from the public authorities the Church should
operate.” Indeed, according to one particular variant, the so-called
“Post-Christendom” perspective, the declining cultural dominance of
Christianity is viewed in a positive light, as a force for change offering
the prospect of a revitalization of the church and the pursuit of a more
direct form of political engagement, rather than one which seeks to
bolster traditional institutional links to the state. Here, Bartley (2007a),
an advocate of this view point, describes “the ending of the churches” pri-
vileged position in society as an exciting opportunity to recapture the
radical social vision of the Gospel of Jesus,” and warns that excessively
close relations with the state “runs the risk of buying into the state’s
policy goals and targets rather than a vision of a different kind of
social order” (Bartley 2007b). Simon Barrow (2008a), co-director of
Ekklesia, adopts a similar position, calling for “a relocation of the
church from the centre to the margins” in order to establish a more
participatory mode of politics; a view expressed by Ekklesia (2006)
itself, which hails the opportunity for “a shift in religious practice
towards questioning power rather than colluding with it.”
This view, however, remains a minority one among Christians in the
UK. For most, the objective is not to accelerate the process of de-linking
the state and religion, but to secure the legitimate right for Christian
groups and organizations to exert influence within the established politi-
cal institutions of the British state. As far as the Christian Institute (2003)
is concerned, the aim in this respect is clear: “Christians,” they proclaim,
“are to work for the state to adopt Christian values and to implement
godly laws.” This vision is also promoted by the Jubilee Centre, a
Cambridge-based research organization seeking to promote social
reform along Christian lines. As Michael Schluter (2007), the Centre’s
founder and chairman, puts it: “wherever possible, Christians should
seek to see God acknowledged in public life — in the constitution, the
school curriculum, and the courts — and not accept a “secular state”
where the Trinitarian God is excluded from the formal activities of the
state.” Going further than this, the proclaimed manifesto of the Jubilee
Centre calls for the explicit adoption of a theologically-inspired social
order, stating that “Government has a divine purpose,” that “God is the
ultimate source of all political authority,” and that “[t]he final goal of










































throughout Scripture in terms of a set of values which are exemplified in
the life of Jesus.” “Christians,” it exclaims, “should prioritise evangelism
. . . to build the Christian community and to increase a right “fear of God”
across society as a whole” (Schluter 2007).
The ground for assertions such as these typically rests on the normative
basis of political pluralism; namely, that people of Christian faith
have the same right as anybody else to make their case in the public
sphere. The Evangelical Alliance, for example, state that “[o]ne of the
most fundamental freedoms for Christians is liberty to proclaim the
gospel,” to “go on asserting our right to proclaim Him freely as such
in the public arena (Theos 2008); Chaplin (2007) declares that
“Christians may in principle freely avail themselves of every available
avenue of political influence afforded by a representative constitutional
democracy”; Scott-Joynt (2003), insists that “from [the] point of view
of the public arena in general . . . we have as much right as anybody
and that includes as much right as people of other faiths and those
from a number of secular philosophies”; while the Baptist Union of
Great Britain states that “for the good of society, faith communities
make their unique contribution . . . a partnership that must recognise
the proper role of both Church and state, allowing the latter to exercise
proper and legitimate power and releasing the former to be a truly prophe-
tic voice” (Evangelical Alliance 2006).
This call for pluralism is combined with a disarming and seemingly
innocuous assertion; namely, that the church has no desire to wield
direct political power, and that it neither seeks nor desires an overly
close relationship with the state. As Williams (2008b) puts it, the goal
is not to establish a theocracy, but for “a crowded and argumentative
public square” in which “religious convictions are granted a public
hearing in debate; not necessarily one in which they are privileged or
regarded as beyond criticism” (Williams 2006). While the church
should not “be able to dictate what Parliament does and what the
nation does,” he notes, it nonetheless “has a right and a duty to get
into the argument and to try and persuade people” (Williams 2008b).
The same point is also well made by Murphy-O’Connor (2006a), who
calls for “respectful dialogue and co-operation between all interested
parties, whether Christians or members of other faiths, agnostics or secu-
larists, and who maintains that “[t]he Church claims only its legitimate
part in the political process . . . not to propose technical solutions to ques-
tions of governance or economic activity, but to help to form a social
culture based on justice, solidarity and truth, for the common good”









































(Williams 2007a). The aim, then, is for a situation in which Christianity
serves as the “metaphor of the leaven in the dough, the unseen agent that
enlivens and animates society from within . . . The Church understood as
leaven does not rule but serves.” On this basis, since “[t]he Church in a
plural society must shun every form of privilege and power and dedicate
herself to serving the common good,” it thereby follows that “[a] servant
Church poses no threat to anyone, so there are no good grounds for
excluding it” (Williams 2007b).
Indeed, a central notion in this aspect of Christian discourse is that the
wielding of direct political power, whether in the form of a church-state
or anything approximating a Christian theocracy, would be eminently
undesirable since this would delimit the freedom of Christians themselves
in matters of morality and conviction. In this sense, the pursuit of a fra-
mework in which Christian groups exert influence within a pluralist
public sphere, as opposed to wielding direct political control, thus
becomes more than a matter of political expediency, but, rather, provides
the best possible form of political arrangement. A key reason for this
stems from the conception of Christian identity, which, as Williams
(2005; also see Williams 2004) explains, contains “graded levels of
loyalty” to state and church. Thus:
The Church of Christ begins by defining itself as a community both along-
side political society and of a different order to political society . . . it does
not seek to set up another empire on the same level as the Roman imper-
ium. It has “citizens”, but their citizenship is not something that requires
them to set up societies in rivalry to the existing systems.
In this context, then, since direct religious rule would leave no space
for independent moral conviction (since all such matters would, by defi-
nition, be determined by the ruling authority), such a political form
would threaten this conception of a dual Christian identity. Put another
way, such an identity would become far harder to sustain if the legitimate
authority for such differentiation was itself the predominant force in the
political realm; a state of affairs, as Williams (2006) puts it, in which “the
Church’s administration [came to] look more and more like a rival kind
of state,” resembling the pre-Reformation “religious sanctioning of state
power as exercised by “godly princes.” In sum, therefore, “the churches
do not campaign for political control (which would undermine their
appeal to the value of personal freedom) but for public visibility — for










































(Williams 2007b). This point is also emphasized by Murphy-O’Connor
(2007a). As he maintains:
The attempt by a state to proclaim a particular religion as true and to force
its observance on people is inimical to Christianity itself. Truth and
freedom need each other, which is why from its beginnings the
Christian Church proclaimed the distinction between temporal and
spiritual.
The call for equal participation in the public realm, for faith to be
treated in an equivalent fashion as all other interests and view points,
however, comes with an important qualification; namely, the right for
Christians to reject the authority of the state when it acts in contravention
of Christian teaching. As the Christian Institute (2006) declare: “There
may be circumstances where the Christian cannot obey the state: if the
state should command what God forbids or forbid what God commands
then the duty of the Christian must be to obey God rather than man.”
Similarly, as Spencer (2008) puts it, the degree and nature of Church-
state relations is, to a great extent, dependent on the nature of the govern-
ing authorities. Thus:
If they do what the Gospel indicates they should do . . . then there is real
opportunity for partnership. If, on the other hand, the authorities’
concept of the good is in serious tension with what the Gospel proclaims
it should be . . . the Church cannot but work against it.
A more extreme version of the same point is put by the Evangelical
Alliance (2006). As they note: political action on a Christian basis
“may, where necessary, take the form of active resistance to the state.
This can take different forms and may encompass disobedience to law,
civil disobedience, involving selective, non-violent resistance or
protest, or ultimately violent revolution.” On this, both mainstream and
Post-Christendom streams of thought are at one. Barrow (2008b), for
instance, contends that a Christian’s relationship to the state and human
authority is “necessarily conditional,” that “good citizenship is a
Christian virtue. But “the good” is very much the defining feature in
this formula, and when it goes wrong . . . resistance is just as much a
duty.” In sum, he concludes, the idea that “religious commitments
should always be secondary to civic ones” was “not a position many of
us find remotely credible.” Here, too, Williams (2008a) is also clear.
“Christians,” he explains, “have historically held to the right to resist









































what is believed to be directly against God’s justice: to disobey, to fail to
obey a command — even from a legally appointed superior — which is in
conscience held to be against God’s justice.”
While these assertions to the limits of political authority may well be
honorable, or even dutiful (indeed, no serious democrat of any persuasion
could contend otherwise), there nevertheless remains an important point
to be made concerning the bases from which the legitimacy, or the right,
to assert such resistance is said to derive; namely, between the notion of
resistance based on an abstract, Enlightenment-based conception of
human rights, and that deriving from elements which are theologically
determined. While this distinction, for most intents and purposes, may
appear largely semantic, the principle it raises is one that is nevertheless
significant. Real ethical differences may, and frequently do arise, for
instance, on matters relating to sexuality, gender, reproduction, and free
speech, which may offend the “convictions” of those professing religious
faith while remaining an interwoven part of the secular tapestry of human
rights that are now central to many liberal democratic societies. In terms
of Christian public discourse, this differentiation between the secular
basis for human rights and that of the divine thus serves to establish a
key argumentative principle; namely, that the legitimate allegiance of
Christianity lies not with “pluralism,” “democracy,” or “human rights”
per se, but with a realm that separates itself from, and subjects itself
to, an altogether different set of criteria.
MORAL STANDARDS
The significance of this point is highlighted by the final components of
Christian public discourse in the UK. Here, a central theme is that contem-
porary British society is currently enduring a state of social, moral, and spiri-
tual decay as a direct result of modernity and its associated culture of
individualist consumerism, and that a greater role for Christianity in the
public sphere is essential if the situation is to be reversed. At this juncture,
Christian public discourse takes a crucial strategic turn, moving from
general and ostensibly neutral claims concerning equality of representation
in the public sphere, to particularist claims inwhich it is asserted that religion
provides a principal source of morality, and that Enlightenment-based secu-
larism has no foundational basis for the elaboration of human values and
ethics. This invokes a subtle discursive shift, from the apparently innocuous










































plurality, to a framing of the more general public narrative in terms of the
problems of (post)modern society, the solution to which, it is argued, can
only be found in a reassertion of religion through its unique abilities as a pro-
vider of ethical virtue and social cohesion. Thus, while Christian discourse
asserts the right to equal participation in the public sphere, the terms of its
entry into the public sphere are shaped in such a way as to allow for
unique and particularizing claims to be made about Christianity as a major
source of morality and as an ethical guarantor of liberal society.
Representative of such claims, for example, are the views of Carey
(2006). Pinning the blame for Britain’s social atrophy squarely on “the
shallow roots of a secular culture,” the ex-Archbishop contends that
this has led invariably to “more crime, broken families, acceptance of
cohabitation instead of marriage, soaring numbers of teen-age pregnan-
cies . . . and a general decline in moral values and standards.” Carey’s
successor makes the point emphatically too, stating that the social pro-
blems of modernity were “a predictable result of abandoning the belief
that each person is the work of God” (Williams 2007b), that “moral per-
spectives don’t just derive from abstract civic principles,” and that
Enlightenment liberalism offers “a set of practices which may exhibit
values and morality but doesn’t generate them” (Williams 2008c). The
involvement of faith, he duly concludes, is necessary in order to
counter “the increasingly atomised and consumerist approach to civil
participation” (Hansard 2006 Q2, Cl.501). The same point is made by
Murphy-O’Connor (2007b), who also attacks the culture of “mindless
consumerism” as the root cause of today’s social problems. This, he
maintains, has helped to create a moral and spiritual vacuum in which
people are experiencing “a sense of loss,” but are being held back from
addressing deeper spiritual questions by the strident nature of contempor-
ary secularism. “[T]here is a pervasive message,” he laments, “that to
commit yourself to God through a religious faith is to take a step back
from being independent and mature” (Williams 2008b). Continuing the
theme, the Archbishop of York also rounds on individualism, highlight-
ing “consumption and the vaunting of individual economic status over
our communal well being” as having “led to a politics which has given
the market the role of moral guardian” (Sentamu 2008). As he explains:
if we push for the end of religion in the public arena, in our politics and the
public square . . . moral responsibility will be displaced not by reason,
science or ethics but by sheer consumerism. The moral imperative of
doing the right thing is in danger of being replaced by the consumerist









































imperative to buy the right thing. And to buy it now, whatever the cost
(Sentamu 2008).
Buttressing the claim that religion, and more particularly Christianity,
offers the proper repose to such decline, and indeed provides a mainstay
for moral authority in the public sphere, is an assertion that excluding reli-
gion from the public realm will lead to a far worse state of affairs. One
reason that is frequently given for this, and one that again draws on the
virtues of liberal pluralism, is that denying Christian groups access to the
public sphere would undermine the very principles of liberalism and toler-
ance on which Western society itself is based. As Murphy-O’Connor
(2007b) puts it, “to banish religion from the public square in the name of
freedom and democracy is to threaten freedom and democracy, and the
very existence of that public square”; or, as Williams (2007b) explains,
“the state will become a sterile and oppressive thing unless it is continually
engaged in conversation with those who speak for the gospel,” and that
“without a willingness to listen to the questions and challenges of the
Church, liberal society is in danger of becoming illiberal” (Williams 2005).
Another reason that is often advanced for the necessity of inclusiveness,
however, although one that sits uneasily with claims of moral virtue, is
that denying religious groups access to the public sphere will only cause
them to become more fundamentalist and more extreme in their beliefs
and actions. As Williams (2005) puts it, allowing religious groups access
to the public sphere “reduces the riskof open social conflict,” since confining
moral and spiritual matters to the private sphere runs the risk that “they may
be distorted into fanaticism and exclusion.” Or, as the Bishop of Derby,
Alastair Redfern (2007), explains, ignoring the voice of the religious
“would risk creating an open space ripe for the proselytising of far more
radical operators of theology and nurture.” Still further, in the words of
Theos (2006, 64): “If you exile religious communities to the margins, then
they will start to speak words of fire among consenting adults, and the
threat to public order and the public arena . . . will grow.”
Having shifted the terms of debate from the general to the particular in
this way, the final aspect of Christian public discourse in the UK attempts
to put its claims concerning the provision of morality beyond question by
stating that religious argument should not be submitted to the same
evidentially-based standards and criteria to which all other participants
in the public sphere are held. Having initially appealed for a right to
representation in the public realm on the basis of liberal equality, it is










































what are considered by many to be the normal terms of public discourse.
A crucial point here is a claim, not merely that no evidence need be sub-
mitted in defense of religiously-based assertions, but, more fundamen-
tally, that the very idea of evidence is itself an inappropriate form for
adjudging the value of such propositions. Thus, McGrath (2005, 135),
for example, asserts both that “the scientific method is incapable of adju-
dicating the God-hypothesis, either positively or negatively,” and that
“evidence takes us thus far, but then when it comes to deciding
between a number of competing explanations, its extremely difficult to
have an evidence-based argument for those final stages” (McGrath
2007). Faith, from this perspective, is now defined not as the originally
formulated “conviction of the mind based on adequate evidence”
(McGrath 2005), but as the point “at which it goes beyond the evidence,”
the need for which is circumvented by an assertion that God is “above,
rather than within, the natural process” (McGrath 2007). This line is
also advanced by, among others, the Archbishop of York, who explains
that:
We’ve gone into the logic, the reasoning, the explanation. Ultimately,
when you have done all of that, there is something bigger than that
which we call mystery . . . Not all things are explainable. Not all things
are solvable. Some things really remain unresolved (Sentamu 2007b).
Or, as Murphy-O’Connor (2006c) maintains, “you don’t prove the doc-
trine of the Resurrection just by reason. It comes as a gift of faith,” “the
mystery of God” means “that proper talk about God is always difficult,
always tentative . . . A God who can be spoken of comfortably and
clearly by human beings cannot be the true God” (Murphy-O’Connor
2008b). The view that religion offers a form of knowledge and experience
that is not open to, and thus cannot be subjected to, rational scientific
inquiry, is also offered by Rowan Williams. As he puts it, religious doc-
trine should not be regarded as something akin to “a scientific system,”
but is rather “an account of the context in which the whole of the universe
exists — the context of God . . . a vision, an imagination, a commitment
rather than a set of explanations” (Williams 2008b). Thus:
that very structure requires some comprehensive energy at another level
that sustains it as what it is. And because that comprehensive energy at
another level is not the product of other things, doesn’t have a history,
isn’t the result of processes going on . . . we are not going to find successful
or comprehensive words for it, but can only gaze into what is undoubtedly









































mysterious, but not mysterious in a way which simply says this is a puzzle
somebody one day might solve (Williams 2007a).
In terms of the overall aims of Christian public discourse, such claims,
which many secularists would regard as little more than obfuscation, are
not simply a case of unreflective ambiguity, or evasion. Rather, they
signify a definite strategic maneuver; a means of circumventing any
thorny arguments about evidence by denying the validity of the very
notion that “God,” and hence by extension claims made on the basis of
faith, can be understood in rationalist and evidential terms. Moreover,
reprising the theme of an aggressive secular assault, and of the theologi-
cal and hermetically sealed nature of Enlightenment thought, it is also
asserted that any attempt to take issue with the above formulation and
to impose any uniformity of criteria on religious groups in the public
sphere is itself a form of discrimination. As Theos (2006, 28) maintain,
“religious participation within the public square must accommodate
itself to public reason, but public reason must be willing to accommodate
itself to religious participation.” Religious bodies and actors, then, should
be willing to adjust their reasoning and language “to what is currently
acknowledged as the norm in public discourse,” although, at the same
time, “should also be willing to challenge that norm, questioning
axioms, confronting arguments and asking all parties, irrespective of
their public identities, to justify their faith-based positions.” Thus:
there remains a wider question about who sets the terms of public dis-
course. Who defines what public reason is? We deceive ourselves if we
say that public reason can be truly neutral . . . and not just because
certain people deem certain texts to be revelatory and others don’t . . .
Who decides what constitutes a proper political reason?
On this, Murphy-O’Connor (2007c) proposes a similar argument,
rejecting any notion of “the establishment of norms that everyone must
accept,” and asserting instead the need to provide “space in which this
conviction can be respected in the public sector.” “[B]eing secular,” he
asserts, “does not mean closing down the space in which religious con-
viction and motivation can shape and contribute to the common good.”
And so, too, is the point made by Williams. Despite claiming that “[r]eli-
gious groups may organize themselves however they choose in private
life, but they must enter public society accepting liberal principles”










































of the liberal secular world view, taking issue with “[t]he tempting idea
that there is always an adequate definition of what everyone will recog-
nise as public and reasonable argument” (Williams 2006).
CONCLUSIONS
In their efforts to justify and legitimize a role for the Christian faith in the
public sphere, Christian actors and organizations in the UK assert and
adhere to a coherent public discourse. This is based on a common
context of decline and secularization, and a common analysis of the
most appropriate forms of argument to deploy in response. Outlining
the core elements of this discourse, and the way in which its nodal
points of argument combine to promote an overarching political objec-
tive, offers a useful initial framework for building a deeper and broader
understanding of the public discourse of religion more generally. The
above analysis thus raises a number of important issues for further
research. It would be particularly useful, for example, to establish
whether or not there are any common elements in the challenges that
are faced by Christianity in the UK and those that are faced by other reli-
gious faiths, both in the UK and in other states; whether there are any
common elements of discourse that exist between separate religions in
different national contexts; and what factors might account for any simi-
larities and differences that may be observed. Consideration of whether or
not there are any grounds for establishing a common public discourse
among religious faiths as a whole also remains a crucial question, as
does the issue of whether there are any inherent compartmentalization
between faiths and locales, and, if so, whether this leads instead to a
patchwork of separate and mutually exclusive “islands” of religious dis-
course. The answers to these questions, or at least research into attempt-
ing to provide the answers, will go a long way to furthering our
understanding of what is one of the most important dynamics of our time.
Although this Endeavour is not one that is likely to be completed with
any degree of rapidity, the foregoing analysis of Christianity in the UK
nevertheless has important implications for the ongoing debate over the
involvement of religion in the public sphere. While consideration of
the terms of religious participation has typically turned on issues such
as “reason,” “fairness,” and “equality” (however they may be defined),
and on questions of how a political framework based on these lines
could be devised (e.g., Audi and Wolterstorff 1997; Rawls 1997;









































Dworkin 2006; Habermas 2006), the above examination highlights the
real tensions that exist between secular arguments for representation
and those that are advanced by Christian public discourse based on
claims of a unique epistemological status. Given the incompatible
nature of these two positions, especially given the denial of eviden-
tially-based norms by the latter, it is highly unlikely that these tensions
will be simply or easily resolved any time soon. If they are found to be
a feature of religious discourse beyond the confines of Christianity in
the UK, then debates over the public role of faith are only likely to
become more fractious as time goes on.
NOTES
1. In a British Social Attitudes Survey conducted in the same year, 41% of the population declared
they as having no religion (see http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/esds/variables/bsa/bsa4615/religion/).
Methodological flaws in the census, such as requiring all questions to be answered by the head of
the household, are also thought to have skewed the results. See Voas and Bruce (2004); National
Secular Society (2005).
2. On the tension between the claim that Christianity deserves a role in the public sphere due to its
deeply entrenched position in British life, and the claim that it needs protecting from marginalization,
see Bartley (2008).
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